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THE OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S
MERGER ENFORCEMENT RECORD: A
REPLY TO BAKER AND SHAPIRO
Daniel A. Crane*
My recent Essay, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated
Antitrust Enforcement?, examined the three major areas of antitrust
enforcement—cartels, mergers, and civil non-merger—and argued that,
contrary to some popular impressions, the Obama Justice Department has not
“reinvigorated” antitrust enforcement.1 Jonathan Baker and Carl Shapiro have
published a response, which focuses solely on merger enforcement.2 Baker and
Shapiro’s argument that the Obama Justice Department actually did
reinvigorate merger enforcement is unconvincing.
QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
Baker, Shapiro, and I agree on at least one thing: quantitative measures of
enforcement are often misleading. As I argued in my original essay, one of the
paradoxes of enforcement statistics as a measure of enforcement vigor is that,
with perfect deterrence, there are no anticompetitive acts at all.3 Or, as Baker
and Shapiro have pointed out, a small number of investigations could evidence
nothing more than the fact that the agencies have become deft at identifying the
problematic mergers without investigation.
These are reasons to downplay all quantitative measures of enforcement—
both mine and Baker and Shapiro’s. Two former Chairs of the Federal Trade
*
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Commission have criticized Baker and Shapiro’s methodology on similar
grounds.4 However, it bears noting that, as a candidate for president in 2008,
then-Senator Obama made a written submission to the American Antitrust
Institute criticizing the Bush Administration’s merger enforcement record using
precisely the “raw numbers” approach that Baker and Shapiro now criticize as
failing to meet academic standards.5 If nothing else, it is surely fair to evaluate
the President’s enforcement record by the measure that he used to judge his
predecessor’s.
Sticking for now with quantitative measures, Baker and Shapiro criticize
me for failing to follow their previously published methodology, which
evaluates a particular administration’s merger enforcement vigor by looking at
its relationship to long-term historical averages. Baker and Shapiro miss the
point, however: my essay was not attempting to ask, in an absolute sense,
whether the Obama Administration’s enforcement record was vigorous or
weak, but was comparing Obama’s enforcement record to that of the Bush
Administration at the period closest in time.6
Baker and Shapiro also criticize me for emphasizing raw numbers rather
than numbers adjusted for Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) filings. Actually, my
Essay reports both measures. But recall once again that it was only raw
numbers that Senator Obama cited in 2008 in comparing the Bush and Clinton
Administrations’ merger enforcement records.
Beyond that, it is far from clear that the adjustment that both my critics and
I make for HSR filings is “more correct” in all circumstances than looking at
the raw numbers. What drove HSR filings down in 2009-2010 was the financial
crisis, which slowed merger activity. Baker and Shapiro implicitly assume that
the ratio of anticompetitive mergers to all mergers remained constant during the
financial crisis, but that is far from certain. It is quite plausible that there were
more anticompetitive mergers proposed during the financial crisis even though
the total number of proposed mergers was lower. The failure and exit of many
firms during a cataclysmic financial crisis and the corresponding increases in

4. See William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case
of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 139-40; Timothy J.
Muris, Facts Trump Politics: The Complexities of Comparing Merger Enforcement over
Time and Between Agencies, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 37-38.
5. Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27,
2007),
available
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf
(“Between
1996 and 2000, the FTC and DOJ together challenged on average more than 70 mergers per
year on the grounds that they would harm consumer welfare. In contrast, between 2001 and
2006, the FTC and DOJ on average only challenged 33.”).
6. I cannot tell if Baker and Shapiro also mean to criticize me for not making the
adjustment they make in their chapter for the change in Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting
requirements in 2001. Baker & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 30 n.7. If so, it is a hollow criticism
since I explicitly was only comparing FY 2007-2008 and FY 2010-2011.

September 2012]OBAMA ANTITRUST RESPONSE

43

market concentration among the surviving firms may mean that a higher
percentage of proposed mergers during a financial crisis will be
anticompetitive. Or, consistent with the historical pattern that antitrust
enforcement often softens during financial crises, as I have previously
documented,7 dominant firms may expect to get away with anticompetitive
mergers during sharp economic downturns and hence propose more of them.
In any event, my essay did report the number of second requests and
investigations adjusted for HSR filings, along with the respective percentage
increases over the Bush Administration. Baker and Shapiro object that I did not
report merger challenges (as opposed to second requests or investigations) on
an adjusted basis but just reported the raw numbers (challenges: Bush 16,
Obama 19; transactions restructured or abandoned: Bush 9, Obama 15). The
reason I did not is that for both administrations the numbers are so small that
reporting on a percentage basis would just create noise. (For the same reason, I
also did not report the true fact that the Nixon/Ford Justice Department brought
seventeen times more monopolization cases than the Obama Administration, or
if adjusted for terms in office, eight and half times as many.8) Also, as former
FTC Chair Timothy Muris has argued in critiquing Baker and Shapiro’s
approach, it is far from clear that the number of challenges or consents is a
good metric of enforcement vigor.9 For example, there are “cheap consents”
exacted by agencies just to show that they are doing something. To circle back
to our point of agreement, all of this cautions in favor of looking beyond
quantitative measures.
QUALITATIVE MEASURES
Turning to qualitative measures, Baker and Shapiro chide me for showing
“little awareness of the context in which decisions were made.” But the
question I was posing was whether the Obama Administration advanced novel
legal or economic theories that would push merger policy in a more prohibitive
direction. As I pointed out, AT&T/T-Mobile—the case widely cited as
evidence of merger reinvigoration—was a four-to-three merger. I presented
four examples of four-to-three challenges by the Bush DOJ. Baker and Shapiro
do not mention these cases, simply insisting that “conventional wisdom”
supports the view that AT&T/T-Mobile was a return to more stringent merger

7. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Enforcement During National Crises: An Unhappy
History, GLOBAL
COMPETITION
POL’Y,
Dec.
2008,
available
at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/antitrust-enforcement-during-nationalcrises-an-unhappy-history.
8. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 448-49 (2003) (reporting that the DOJ and FTC
under Nixon/Ford brought seventeen monopolization cases).
9. Muris, supra note 4, at 37.
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enforcement. Baker and Shapiro criticize my qualitative analysis as “informal
and subjective,” but their unsupported appeal to “conventional wisdom” is just
that.
Baker and Shapiro are right that cases like AT&T/T-Mobile and H&R
Block/Tax Act “changed [the Administration’s] reputation.” During the first
two years of the Obama Administration, many antitrust insiders were
scratching their heads about why the Administration was not living up to
expectations by bringing big, daring antitrust cases. For example, a September
8, 2010, article in the Washington Post was entitled “Obama Antitrust Enforcement Looking Like More of the Same.”10 After the two aforementioned
cases—and the Apple e-books case—the pendulum began to swing, and we
began to hear about the Obama Administration’s tougher antitrust enforcement.
The question I was asking was whether the new “tough-guy” reputation is
deserved. Simply pointing back to the enhancement in reputation does not
address this question.
Further, if the relevant category is “things that create reputations,” it is
worth noting that the Bush Administration did some things that created a
reputation for enhanced toughness but that did not show up in the statistics. In
particular, the Bush Justice Department’s well-publicized plans to block
Google and Yahoo’s advertising joint venture created lots of buzz about the
Administration’s willingness to go after deals in the tech sector.
Additionally, I am puzzled by Baker and Shapiro’s assertion that I should
have consulted their survey of practitioners. They administered it in March of
2007, which means that it could not tell us anything useful about the Obama
Administration’s enforcement record. When Baker and Shapiro recently
updated their statistical analysis to incorporate data from the Obama
Administration,11 they did not update their practitioner survey.
I am also at a loss to understand Baker and Shapiro’s criticism of my
treatment of the two major vertical mergers that have taken place under the
Obama
Administration—LiveNation/TicketMaster
and
Comcast/NBC
Universal. I described the legal theories as adventurous and credited the
Administration for obtaining significant structural and/or conduct remedies.
Although they do not fully explain themselves, Baker and Shapiro seem to
argue that the Bush Administration never challenged vertical mergers and
therefore that anything that the Obama Administration does on vertical
mergers—even actions like allowing LiveNation/TicketMaster and
10. See Jia Lynn Yang, Obama Antitrust Enforcement Looking Like More of the Same,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2010, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/07/AR2010090706755.html.
11. See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorated Merger Enforcement in the
Obama Administration, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG (June 25, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/06/reinvigorated-mergerenforcement-in-the-obama-administration.html.
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Comcast/NBC Universal that were roundly criticized by the left—were
stronger than the Bush Administration’s response in similar situations. But the
Bush Administration did challenge at least one merger in part based on its
vertical elements.12
The same is true of the Obama Justice Department’s revised remedies
guidelines, which the American Antitrust Institute13 and many others have read
as being more receptive than the Bush Administration’s guidelines to conduct
remedies, and which have attracted criticism from some who favor more
aggressive antitrust enforcement and who view conduct remedies as licenses
for anticompetitive mergers. Baker and Shapiro complain that I should have
said whether the revised guidelines would have been used to put some remedy
in place on Bush-era mergers that were not challenged at all. I cannot possibly
know the answer to that question, nor do Baker and Shapiro suggest one.
Finally, Baker and Shapiro take issue with my statement that an upward
revision of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) thresholds “suggests that
greater levels of concentration resulting from a horizontal merger will be
necessary to trigger antitrust scrutiny than under the previous regime.” That is
literally true—it is what the revisions suggest. Baker and Shapiro argue that the
suggestion does not reflect reality. And then they slip into an analogy to
speeding, where the law has been 50 miles per hour for a long time and
everyone drives 70, so the law is changed to 60 and is more strictly enforced.
The problem with this analogy is Baker and Shapiro’s quick and unexplained
assumption that the new thresholds will be strictly enforced—that the de facto
and de jure speed limits will align at 60 rather than the de facto speed rising to
80, as often happens when speed limits are raised. Is it really the case that, after
August 19, 2010 (the date of the horizontal merger guideline revisions), most
mergers with an HHI over 2500 and a delta over 200 (the new threshold for
mergers that are considered presumptively anticompetitive) are being
challenged? I doubt it, and Baker and Shapiro do not offer any reason to
believe that is the case.
CONCLUSION
Jon Baker and Carl Shapiro are smart, effective economists for whom I
have great respect. I have few quarrels with how they or the Obama
Administration in general conduct antitrust enforcement. The point of my essay
was that antitrust enforcement has become largely technocratic and
12. Complaint at 3, 11-12, United States v. Monsanto Co., No. CIVA 1:07-CV-00992
(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f223600/223677.htm.
13. JOHN E. KWOKA & DIANA L. MOSS, BEHAVIORAL MERGER REMEDIES: EVALUATION
AND
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
(2011),
available
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/AAI_wp_behavioral%20remedi
es_final.pdf.
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independent of political ideology. I have heard nothing that dissuades me from
that view.

